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Abstract
This paper introduces an epistemic model of a boundedly rational agent under
the two assumptions that (i) the agent￿ s reasoning process is in accordance with
the model but (ii) the agent does not re￿ ect on these reasoning processes. For such
a concept of bounded rationality a semantic interpretation by the possible world
semantics of the Kripke (1963) type is no longer available because the de￿nition
of knowledge in these possible world semantics implies that the agent knows all
valid statements of the model. Key to my alternative semantic approach is the
extension of the method of truth tables, ￿rst introduced for the propositional
logic by Wittgenstein (1922), to an epistemic logic so that I can determine the
truth value of epistemic statements for all relevant truth conditions. I also de￿ne
an axiom system plus inference rules for knowledge- and unawareness statements
whereby I drop the inference rule of necessitation, which claims that an agent
knows all theorems of the logic. As my main formal result I derive a determination
theorem linking my semantic with my syntactic approach.
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11 Introduction
Existing epistemic models consider agents who know all theorems of the underlying
logical language. Such an agent would, for example, know all tautologies of the propo-
sitional calculus; however, this is impossible for any real human being. While these
existing epistemic models thus describe the benchmark case of a super-rational individ-
ual who is perfectly re￿ ective about the - supposed - rules of human reasoning processes,
this paper introduces the opposite benchmark case of an individual who does not re￿ ect
at all on the rules of human reasoning processes. Such an individual is still a logical
agent in the sense that his reasoning processes are comprehensively described by the
theorems of the considered epistemic logic. He is, however, also boundedly rational in
the sense that he does not know these theorems. The epistemic model developed in this
paper is - arguably - closer to reality than existing epistemic models since hardly any
real human re￿ ects on how they or others arrive at logical conclusions.
If an agent does not re￿ ect on reasoning processes, a semantic interpretation by
possible world semantics of the Kripke (1963) type is no longer available because the
de￿nition of knowledge in these possible world semantics implies that the agent knows
all valid statements of the model. As this paper￿ s main conceptual contribution
I therefore introduce a semantic interpretation of epistemic statements under the as-
sumption that an agent does not necessarily know the valid statements of the model.1
Key to my alternative semantic approach, called ESM, is the development of truth tables
which determine the truth value of epistemic statements for all relevant truth conditions.
Furthermore, I de￿ne an epistemic logic, i.e., an axiom system plus inference rules for
knowledge- and unawareness statements, called TKU, where I drop the inference rule of
necessitation, which claims that an agent knows all theorems of the logic. As my main
formal result I derive a determination theorem which states that every theorem of TKU
is a tautology of ESM and that every tautology of ESM is a theorem of TKU.
As a secondary conceptual contribution, the present paper provides a semantic
interpretation of unawareness statements by means of truth tables. In the economic
literature (cf. Theorem 1.i in Dekel,Lipman, and Rustichini, 1998a) it is well known
that the inference rule of necessitation is incompatible with a non-degenerate concept of
unawareness. Subsequent research (cf. Section 2.3: ￿Related literature￿ ) has therefore
focussed on the development of epistemic models which may incorporate unawareness
statements. Since I do not impose necessitation as a valid inference rule, my epistemic
1Notice that the agent￿ s inability to re￿ect on reasoning processes refers to the situation where
the agent does not know the valid statements of the model. In contrast, the inability for ￿positive
introspection￿ , discussed in the epistemic literature, describes the situation where the agent does not
know that he knows some statement.
2model of a boundedly rational agent can easily accommodate such a non-degenerate
concept of unawareness.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains in more detail
my semantic as well as my syntactic approach; moreover, the relation of my approach to
the existing literature is discussed.. Section 3 introduces the formal language. In Section
4 the iterative procedure for determining the truth value of formulas is presented; with
examples given in Section 5. I describe my syntactic approach in Section 6 where I also
present the determination theorem. The according proofs of soundness and completeness
are relegated to the Appendix. As an application of my epistemic logic I argue in Section
7 that the standard argument of ￿common knowledge of rationality￿may not be su¢ cient
for the epistemic justi￿cation of iterative solution concepts for strategic games. Section
8 concludes with a critical discussion of my approach.
2 The approach
2.1 The semantic approach
A semantic model of the Kripke (1963) type, i.e., a standard model, is de￿ned as a triple
M = hW;R;Pi such that W is a set of possible worlds, R is a binary relation on W
(interpreted as the ￿possibility￿ /￿reachability￿relation between di⁄erent worlds), and
P is a mapping that assigns to every atomic sentence of the logic the set of possible
worlds at which this atomic sentence is true. According to the semantic interpretation
of the knowledge operator by a standard model, it is true that the agent knows statement
A in world ￿ 2 W if and only if statement A is true in all possible worlds ￿ that are
reachable from ￿, i.e., ￿R￿. Since tautologies are, by de￿nition, true in all possible
worlds, any tautology of a standard model is known to the agent. As a consequence,
standard models are not suitable for a semantic interpretation of epistemic statements
about an agent who is boundedly rational in my sense. I therefore use the traditional
method of truth tables for the semantic interpretation of epistemic statements.
The semantic interpretation by truth tables (introduced by Wittgenstein, 1922, para-
graphs 4.25-4.53) is standard for propositional statements. Consider some atomic sen-
tence p (e.g., T. Pynchon is a reclusive) and observe that there are exactly two truth
conditions (=states of a⁄air) - namely p is true (=v) and p is false (=f) - that are





For the semantic interpretation of more complex propositional formulas, which in-
clude k di⁄erent atomic sentences, there are exactly 2k possible combinations of the
atomic sentences￿truth values. For example, there are exactly four truth conditions
that are relevant to the semantic interpretation of a statement p ) q (e.g., IF T. Pyn-
chon is a reclusive THEN J.D. Salinger is a reclusive) so that p ) q is false i⁄ p is






For epistemic statements, i.e., statements that include knowledge or unawareness
operators, the development of truth tables is not as straightforward since there are
typically more relevant truth conditions than all possible combinations of truth values
for atomic sentences appearing in the statement. For example, in my interpretation
of the knowledge operator we want to ensure that an epistemic statement of the form
Agent X knows that T. Pynchon is a reclusive, denoted as K (p), must be false when it
is false that T. Pynchon is a reclusive whereas it may be either true or false when it is
true that T. Pynchon is a reclusive. As a consequence, there are three di⁄erent truth
conditions which are relevant to the semantic interpretation of statement K (p) so that





Similarly, for the semantic interpretation of the epistemic statement Agent X is un-
aware that T. Pynchon is a reclusive, denoted as U (p), I assume that regardless whether
it is true or false that T. Pynchon is a reclusive it might be true or false that the agent
is totally unaware of the possibility that there might be some reclusive subject identi￿ed
as T. Pynchon. Hence, there are four relevant truth conditions for statement U (p) so






More speci￿cally, besides adopting the standard semantics for propositional opera-
tors, I stipulate for ESM the following truth conditions for the knowledge operator, K,
and the unawareness operator, U:
Knowledge operator
1. If A is true, then the agent may or may not know A. That is, if A is true, then
K (A) may be true or false.
2. If A is false, then the agent must not know A, i.e., K (A) must be false if A is
false.
3. If the agent knows that A implies B, then the agent knows B if he knows A.
Formally, if K (A ) B) and K (A) are true, then K (B) is also true.
Unawareness operator
4. If it is true that the agent is unaware of A, i.e., if U (A) is true, then A may be
true or false.
5. If it is false that the agent is unaware of A, i.e., if U (A) is false, then A may be
true or false.
6. If the agent is unaware of A, then it is false
- that the agent knows A;
- that he knows that he does not know A; etc.
That is, if U (A) is true, then K (A), ..., K (:K (:::::K (A))), etc. must be false.
7. If the agent is unaware of A, then it is false
- that the agent knows his unawareness;
- that he knows that he does not know his unawareness; etc.
That is, if U (A) is true, then K (U (A)), ..., K (:K (:::::K (U (A)))), etc. must be
false.
In Section 4 I describe an iterative procedure that unambiguously determines the
truth table for any given formula of the language (introduced in Section 3) according
to these semantic conditions. Through this procedure it is therefore possible to decide
for any formula whether it is a tautology (true for all relevant truth conditions), a
5contradiction (false for all relevant truth conditions), or an empirical statement (neither
true nor false for all relevant truth conditions) of ESM.
2.2 The syntactic approach
While the semantic approach looks at conditions that determine the truth value of
statements, the syntactic approach de￿nes an epistemic logic as some ￿nite collection of
axioms and inference rules. The theorems of this logic (i.e., any statement that may be
derived from these axioms by the application of inference rules) may be interpreted as
the rules by which an agent processes knowledge and arrives at conclusions. Epistemic
logics are typically de￿ned as some modal logic, e.g., the axiom systems S5, KD45 etc.
(cf. Chellas, 1980), for which the necessity operator ￿ is interpreted as the knowledge
operator K. While, in general, some statement A may be either true or false, the
modal statement ￿(A) quali￿es A as a statement that is necessarily true. Given that
the theorems of some modal logic are interpreted as logical laws, it is natural to claim
that all theorems of this logic must necessarily be true. For modal logics this claim is
formally accomplished by the inference rule of necessitation, which states that we can
deduce ￿(A) as a theorem whenever A is a theorem. However, when an epistemic logic
is just de￿ned as such a modal logic, the inference rule of necessitation implies that the
agent has absolute power of re￿ ection on reasoning processes in the sense that he knows
every theorem of the epistemic logic.
Applied to an epistemic logic, I therefore regard necessitation (also called knowledge
generalization) as an extremely idealizing assumption. In my opinion, any relevant
concept of a boundedly rational agent has to drop - or at least to weaken - necessitation
as a valid inference rule. Since I am interested in a boundedly rational agent who
might not have any power of self-re￿ ection, I introduce an epistemic logic, called TKU,
which excludes necessitation as inference rule without substituting it by some weakened
version. More speci￿cally, TKU will be de￿ned as follows (for the moment being just
read the symbols );: as ￿IF...THEN￿ , ￿NOT￿ ):
All theorems and inference rules of propositional logic are theorems and inference rules
of TKU;
The knowledge axiom K, i.e., K (p) ) p, and the knowledge distribution axiom T, i.e.,
K (p ) q) ) (K (p) ) K (q)), are axioms of TKU;
With respect to the relationship between the unawareness- and the knowledge operator,
I assume that :K (U (p)), U (p) ) :K (p) and U (p) ) :K (U (p)) are axioms
of TKU. For example, the following statements are theorems of TKU: Agent X
6does not know that he is unaware that T. Pynchon is a reclusive; and If Agent X is
unaware that T. Pynchon is a reclusive then he does neither know that T. Pynchon
is a reclusive nor does he know that he is unaware that T. Pynchon is a reclusive.
Regarding the relationship between the unawareness- and the knowledge operator, I
also introduce two epistemic inference rules of TKU, which can be interpreted
as formalizations of the assumption that unawareness implies arbitrary levels of
ignorance such as Agent X does not know that he does not know that T. Pynchon
is a reclusive, if he is unaware that T. Pynchon is a reclusive; and Agent X does
not know that he does not know that he is unaware that T. Pynchon is a reclusive,
if he is unaware that T. Pynchon is a reclusive.
2.3 Related literature
As the present paper, Fagin and Halpern (1988) depart from the observation that a se-
mantic interpretation by standard models only applies to epistemic statements of agents
which satisfy extremely strong rationality assumptions. For the semantic interpretation
of epistemic statements of a boundedly rational agent, Fagin and Halpern propose so-
called awareness structures M￿ = hW;R;P;Ai which extend standard models by the
awareness-operator A that assigns to every possible world ￿ 2 W some subset of the
formulas in P. According to their interpretation, the set A(a) ￿ P contains all the
statements the agent is aware of in world ￿. According to the semantic interpretation
of the knowledge operator by an awareness structure, it is true that the agent knows
statement A in world ￿ 2 W, if and only if, (i) statement A is true in all possible worlds
￿ that are reachable from ￿, i.e., ￿R￿, and (ii) the agent is aware of statement A in
world ￿ 2 W, i.e., A 2 A(￿). Formally, the appropriate speci￿cation of A may therefore
determine any subset of statements known to the agent according to the standard model
M = hW;R;Pi as the set of statements known to the agent according to the awareness
structure M￿ = hW;R;P;Ai.
In order to avoid replacing the strong semantic interpretation of the knowledge oper-
ator by standard models by an arbitrary principle, Fagin and Halpern discuss plausible
properties of the awareness operator A which e⁄ectively restrict the arbitrariness of
knowledge in awareness-structures. Among other proposals, Fagin and Halpern con-
sider the case where awareness is generated by atomic sentences, that is, the agent is
aware of a statement, if and only if, he is aware of all atomic sentences that appear in
this statement. Moreover, Halpern (2001) observes that awareness-structures with this
particular speci￿cation of the awareness operator are basically equivalent to so-called
generalized standard models of Modica and Rustichini (1999). Modica and Rustichini
7derive a corresponding determination theorem for an epistemic logic where the inference
rule of necessitation is reduced to an inference rule implying that whenever some atomic
sentences are known to the agent then he must also know all theorems that (exclusively)
refer to these atomic sentences.
While the proposals of Fagin and Halpern and of Modica and Rustichini for controlled
generalizations of standard models are very compelling, they still impose rather strong
rationality assumptions. They describe an agent with absolute power of self-re￿ ection
restricted to the domain of statements he is aware of, so that the agent knows, e.g., all
tautologies containing atomic sentences he is aware of (Modica and Rustichini, 1999).
In contrast, this paper describes a boundedly rational agent who might not have any
power of self-re￿ ection. Therefore, my syntactic approach TKU simply drops necessity
as a valid inference rule without substituting it, as in Modica and Rustichini, by some
weakened version restricted to some domain of statements the agent is aware of.
Recently, economic theorists have become interested in epistemic logics where agents
may be unaware about statements (=events) in the sense that (cf. Modica and Rusti-
chini, 1994; Dekel,Lipman, and Rustichini, 1998a, 1998b):
An agent does not know some statement,
and he does not know that he does not know this statement,
and so on...
Building on the seminal contribution of Modica and Rustichini (1994), Dekel, Lip-
man, and Rustichini (1998a) claim that the following three axioms stand for natural
properties of an according unawareness operator:
￿KU-introspection￿ : :K (U (A))
￿Plausibility￿ : U (A) ) (:K (A) ^ :K (:K (A)))
￿AU-introspection￿ : U (A) ) U (U (A))
where A is an arbitrary statement of the language. As their main result, Dekel,Lipman,
and Rustichini demonstrate (Theorem 1.i) that for any epistemic logic which satis￿es
these three axioms ￿the agent is never unaware of anything￿(Dekel,Lipman, and Rusti-
chini, 1998a p. 166) when necessitation is a valid inference rule of this logic. The proof is
easy: Applying necessitation to KU-intropspection gives K (:K (U (A))) whereas plau-
sibility and AU-introspection imply U (A) ) :K (:K (U (A))), which results in a con-
tradiction whenever U (A) is a true statement, i.e., whenever the agent is unaware of
anything. As a consequence, Dekel,Lipman, and Rustichini conclude that the inference
rule of necessitation precludes any non-trivial epistemic logic with unawareness.
Similarly, my epistemic logic TKU contains KU-introspection, :K (U (p)), as an
axiom and the statement U (p) ) :K (:K (U (p))) follows as theorem of TKU. Thus,
8if necessitation was a valid inference rule of TKU, I would run into the same di¢ culty
with unawareness statements as observed by Dekel,Lipman, and Rustichini. However,
since TKU precludes necessitation as a valid inference rule, my boundedly rational agent
may be actually unaware about something without running into contradictions.
An alternative approach to modelling unawareness is proposed in Heifetz, Meier, and
Schipper (2005) who proceed in the tradition of Aumann￿ s (1976) set-theoretic notion
of the knowledge operator in order to develop a generalized structure of a state space
which admits for non-trivial unawareness statements. Key to their approach is the
de￿nition of the whole state space as a union of di⁄erent state spaces that are partially
ordered with respect to their ￿expressiveness￿ . The proposed semantic interpretation
of states of the world as truth-value combinations in example 1 (Heifetz at al., 2005)
seems to suggest that there might be a close link between their approach and a semantic
interpretation by truth tables with respect to three di⁄erent truth values for atomic
sentences. For instance, the di⁄erent states of the world that de￿ne in their example 1 the
event Statement r is true could be equivalently written as all truth value combinations
where r is assigned v given that the truth values of the atomic sentences p;q;r can
take on values in fv;f;?g where ? indicates that the statement is neither true nor false.
And indeed, in a recent investigation Halpern and Rego (2005) demonstrate that the
approach of Heifetz at al.(2005) ￿[...] di⁄ers from standard epistemic logic by allowing
a third truth value.￿ (p. 11).
While the present paper considers an agent who is boundedly rational in the sense
that he does not necessarily re￿ ect on the logical rules he applies, Kaneko and Suzuki
(2003, 2005) are interested in a concept of bounded rationality which captures the limited
ability of agents to apply logical rules. In particular, they propose a measure for the
complexity of logical deductions within an inference system of intuitionistic logic of the
Gentzen-type so that the proof of a particular formula may demand more rationality
on behalf of the agent than the proof of another formula. In contrast, my approach
presumes that the imposed logical rules correctly describe the reasoning process of the
agent no matter how complex these rules are.
3 Preliminaries: The formal language
This section de￿nes our formal language as a collection of well formulated formulas
(=w⁄), which may di⁄er by their epistemic degree. Formally, I partition the set of all
w⁄ into the subsets ￿k, k 2 f0;1;2;:::g, where k stands for the epistemic degree of the
w⁄ belonging to ￿k.
9De￿nition: W⁄ (well formulated formulas) are iteratively constructed, for k 2
f0;1;2;:::g, as follows:
0.1 Variables for atomic sentences, e.g., p;q;r;p1;p2;::: are members of ￿0.
0.2 If A;B 2 ￿0 then :A;(A ) B) 2 ￿0.
0.3 All w⁄ A 2 ￿0 are derived from 0.1 and 0.2.
k+1.1 If A 2 ￿k then K (A);U (A) 2 ￿k+1.
k+1.2 If A 2 ￿k+1 and B 2 ￿j with j ￿ k + 1, then :A;(A ) B);(B ) A) 2 ￿k+1.
k+1.3 All w⁄ A 2 ￿k+1 are derived from k+1.1 and k+1.2.
The symbol : denotes the negation - to be read as: NOT - of the classical proposi-
tional logic; ) denotes the subjunction - to be read as: IF ... THEN. K is interpreted
as knowledge operator so that K (A) reads as ￿The agent knows A.￿U is interpreted as
unawareness operator so that U (A) reads as ￿The agent is unaware of A.￿The above
de￿nition of a w⁄ entails that any w⁄ can be constructed in an obvious way by an it-
erative procedure that starts with atomic sentences and either links existing w⁄ by the
connective ) or adds :;K;U to existing w⁄. Whenever some w⁄ A appears at some
stage in the iterative procedure which generates a w⁄ C, we say that w⁄ C contains
w⁄ A or equivalently: w⁄ A occurs in w⁄ C. ￿0 collects all w⁄ of the propositional
calculus. Furthermore, observe that a w⁄ C belongs to ￿k with k ￿ 1 if and only if
there occur K (A) or U (B) in C such that A and B belong to ￿k￿1. Thus, the epistemic
degree of a w⁄is a measure for the ￿nestedness￿of epistemic operators appearing in the
w⁄. The epistemic w⁄ K (A) or U (B) occur separated in w⁄ C whenever they are not
contained in some epistemic w⁄that also occurs in C. For example, U (p) and K (U (q))
are separated in K (U (q)) ) U (p) but U (q) is not.
Note that all w⁄ which are not atomic sentences can be either described as :A,
A ) B (whereby we drop the outer parentheses), K (A) or U (A). The respective
















we call the w⁄ A1;A2;:::;Ak the antecedents and the w⁄ E the consequent of F.
10Remark: I consider only the propositional operators : and ) because the formal
proofs are much more transparent when the formal language is kept as lean as possible.
Observe that alternative connectives of the propositional calculus such as ^ , _ , , (to
be read as: AND, OR, IF AND ONLY IF) could easily be introduced into our formal
language by the following notational conventions:
:(A ) :B) = defA ^ B
(:A ) B) = defA _ B
:((A ) B) ) :(B ) A)) = def (A , B).
4 An iterative procedure for the development of truth
tables
This section presents an iterative procedure which e⁄ectively develops the truth table
for any given w⁄ such that the semantic conditions 1-7 of ESM are satis￿ed. Since the
rows of such a truth table represent all truth conditions that are relevant for deciding
whether the w⁄ is true or false, we interpret these rows as the relevant states of a⁄air.
Step 1. Write down in a table all possible combinations of truth value assignments,
v or f, to atomic sentences that occur in E. Note that if there are k di⁄erent atomic
sentences, then this tableau will consist of 2k rows of di⁄erent truth value assignments.
Step 2. If some w⁄ A, B, occurring in E, are assigned some truth value, then assign










Step 3. If there occur epistemic w⁄ K (A) in E such that A has some truth value
while K (A) has not, then duplicate all rows of the table where v is assigned to A and
assign truth values to K (A) as follows:2
2It can easily be shown that the order of duplication does not matter if there are several w⁄
K (A1);K (A2);::: such that A1;A2;::: have truth values whereas K (A1);K (A2);::: have not. (The





Step 4. If there occur epistemic w⁄ K (A ) B), K (A), and K (B) in E with truth
values, then delete all rows from the table which contain the following truth values:
K (A ) B) K (A) K (B)
v v f
Step 5. If there occur epistemic w⁄ U (A) in E such that A has some truth value
while U (A) has not, then duplicate all rows of the table and assign truth values to






Step 6. If there occur epistemic w⁄U (A) and K (U (A)) or ... or K (:K (:::::K (U (A))))
in E with truth values, then delete all rows such that U (A) and K (U (A)) or ... or
U (A) and K (:K (:::::K (U (A)))) are simultaneously true.
Step 7. If there occur epistemic w⁄ U (A) and K (A) or ... or K (:K (:::::K (A)))
in E with truth values, then delete all rows such that U (A) and K (A) or ... or U (A)
and K (:K (:::::K (A))) are simultaneously true.
Step 8. If E contains some w⁄ without truth values repeat step 2 - step 7.
5 Examples: Tautologies and empirical statements
Given any w⁄E, the described iterative procedure assigns after a ￿nite number of steps
truth values to the main-operator of E so that there do not remain any w⁄ occurring
in E without a truth value. If these truth values for the main-operator of E are true
(false) at all rows of the table we call E a tautology (contradiction) of ESM. Otherwise
(i.e., there are true as well as false truth values) we speak of an empirical statement.
That is, there exists some states of the world where an empirical statement is true while
12there also exist some states of the world where it is false. So, to decide whether such a
statement is actually true or false is ultimately an empirical but not a logical task.
The following w⁄ turn out to be tautologies of ESM:
1. K (p) ) p
2. :K (U (p))
3. K (p ) q) ) (K (p) ) K (q))
4. K (p) ) :K (:p)
5. K (p) ) :U (p)
6. K (:p) ) :U (p)
7. K (U (p)) ) :U (p)
8. U (p) ) :K (p)
...
8+k. U (p) ) :K (:K (::::K (p)))
9+k. U (p) ) :K (U (p))
...
9+2k. U (p) ) :K (:K (::::K (U (p))));
whereas the following w⁄ are only empirical statements of ESM:
1. K (p) ) K (K (p)) (=￿positive introspection￿ )
2. :K (p) ) K (:K (p)) (= ￿negative introspection￿ )
3. U (p) ) U (U (p))
4. U (U (p)) ) U (p)
5. :K (:K (U (p)))
...
5+k-1. :K (:K (::::K (U (p)))).
In what follows I prove this claim for selected w⁄ by describing in detail the de-
velopment of truth tables for these w⁄, (the proofs for K (p) ) p and K (p ) q) )
(K (p) ) K (q)) appear in the Appendix where soundness is proved; the proofs for the
remaining w⁄ are left to the reader).
Example 1. :K (U (p)) is a tautology of ESM.
Proof:
131. Assign truth values to atomic sentences according to step 1:
: K (U (p))
v
f
2. Duplicate all rows and assign truth values according to step 5:





3. Duplicate rows where U (p) is true and assign truth values according to step 3:







4. According to step 8, delete the rows where K (U (p)) and U (p) are simultaneously
true:





5. Finally, by step 2:
: K (U (p))
v f v v
v f f v
v f v f
v f f f
14In all rows the main-operator is assigned true, which proves the claim.￿
Example 2. U (p) ) :K (p) is a tautology of ESM.
Proof:
1. Assign truth values to atomic sentences according to step 1:
U (p) ) : K (p)
v v
f f
2. Duplicate rows where K (p) is true and assign truth values according to step 3:




3. Duplicate all rows and assign truth values according to step 5:
U (p) ) : K (p)
v v v v
f v v v
v v f v
f v f v
v f f f
f f f f
4. According to step 7, delete all rows where U (p) and K (p) are simultaneously
true:
U (p) ) : K (p)
f v v v
v v f v
f v f v
v f f f
f f f f
155. By step 2:
U (p) ) : K (p)
f v f v v
v v v f v
f v v f v
v f v f f
f f v f f
5. Finally, by step 2:
U (p) ) : K (p)
f v v f v v
v v v v f v
f v v v f v
v f v v f f
f f v v f f
In all rows the main-operator is assigned true, which proves the claim.￿
Example 3. K (p) ) :K (:p) is a tautology of ESM.
Proof:
1. By step 1:
K (p) ) : K (: p)
v v
f f
2. By step 2:
K (p) ) : K (: p)
v f v
f v f
3. By step 3:
K (p) ) : K (: p)
v v f v
f v f v
f f v f
164. By step 3:
K (p) ) : K (: p)
v v f f v
f v f f v
f f v v f
f f f v f
5. Repeating step 2 twice ￿nally gives:
K (p) ) : K (: p)
v v v v f f v
f v v v f f v
f f v f v v f
f f v v f v f
￿
Example 4. K (p) ) K (K (p)), i.e., ￿positive introspection￿ , is not a tautology of
ESM.
Proof:
1. By step 1:
K (p) ) K (K (p))
v v
f f
2. By step 3:
K (p) ) K (K (p))
v v v v
f v f v
f f f f
3. By step 3:
K (p) ) K (K (p))
v v v v v
v v f v v
f v f f v
f f f f f
174. By step 2:
K (p) ) K (K (p))
v v v v v v
v v f f v v
f v v f f v
f f v f f f
￿
6 The main result: A determination theorem
In this section I present the epistemic logic TKU, which I de￿ne as the axioms and
inference rules of the propositional calculus P2 (cf. Church, 1996, p.119⁄.) plus two
knowledge axioms, three unawareness axioms, and two additional inference rules for
unawareness statements:
Axioms of P2
A1: p ) (q ) p)
A2: (p ) (q ) r)) ) ((p ) q) ) (p ) r))
A3: (:p ) :q) ) (q ) p)
Knowledge axioms
T: K (p) ) p
K: K (p ) q) ) (K (p) ) K (q))
Unawareness axioms
U1: :K (U (p))
U2: U (p) ) :K (p)
U3: U (p) ) :K (U (p))







18where Afp1;:::;pm=C1;:::;Cmg denotes the w⁄which results when the atomic sentences
pj, j = 1;:::;m, occurring in A, are replaced by w⁄ Cj , j = 1;:::;m.
Inference rules for Unawareness-Statements
UR1:
U (A) ) :K (::::K (A))
U (A) ) :K (:K (::::K (A)))
UR2:
U (A) ) :K (::::K (U (A)))
U (A) ) :K (:K (::::K (U (A))))
A w⁄ A is called a theorem of the epistemic logic TKU if and only if it is either one
of the axioms of TKU or it can be derived from these axioms by an application of the
inference rules of TKU. Now we are ready to present this paper￿ s main result, which
states that the epistemic logic TKU is determined by the semantic model ESM.
Determination Theorem
￿ TKU is sound with respect to ESM, i.e., every theorem of TKU is a tautology
of ESM.
￿ TKU is complete with respect to ESM, i.e., every tautology of ESM is a
theorem of TKU.
The formal details of the proof are relegated to the appendix. Proving soundness
is rather straightforward and standard: At ￿rst I show that all axioms of TKU are
tautologies of ESM; in a second step I demonstrate that the application of the inference
rules of TKU to tautologies of ESM will again result in tautologies of ESM.
Proving completeness is somewhat more complicated. In particular, I proceed as
follows:
1. For any given w⁄ E 2 ￿k with k ￿ 0 I construct - by an iterative procedure - a
speci￿c w⁄ F 2 ￿0 with
F := A1 ) (A2 ) (:::AM ) E
￿):::) (1)
such that F is a tautology of the propositional calculus if E is a tautology of ESM.









such that F ￿ is a theorem of TKU if F is a theorem of the propositional calculus.
3. By construction, the antecedents A￿
1,..., A￿
M are theorems of TKU, so that - by
modus ponens - E is a theorem of TKU if F ￿ is a theorem of TKU.
4. Finally, recall (cf. Church, 1996) that a w⁄ F is a theorem of the propositional
calculus if and only if F is a tautology of the propositional calculus. Hence,
combining the above steps we can conclude: if E is a tautology of ESM, then E is
also a theorem of TKU.
Observe that the proof of completeness is constructive in the sense that it o⁄ers an
e⁄ective way for deriving any tautology of ESM as a theorem of TKU. The following
example is based on the procedure used in my completeness proof.
Example: Suppose we want to show directly that the following tautology of ESM
E := :K (:(p ) p)) 2 ￿
1
is also a theorem of TKU. At ￿rst construct the w⁄
F := (q ) :(p ) p)) ) :q 2 ￿
0
and observe that F is a tautology of the propositional calculus, implying that F is a
theorem of TKU. Thus, we can apply the substitution rule to F in order to obtain the
following theorem of TKU
F
￿ := (K (:(p ) p)) ) :(p ) p)) ) :K (:(p ) p)) 2 ￿
1
where q is replaced by K (:(p ) p)). By an application of the substitution rule to the
knowledge axiom K, the antecedent
K (:(p ) p)) ) :(p ) p)
in F ￿ is a theorem of TKU so that we derive, by modus ponens,
:K (:(p ) p))
as a theorem of TKU.￿
207 Illustration: Iterative solution concepts
It is a standard argument that so-called iterative solution concepts for strategic games
(cf., e.g., Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984; Tan and Werlang, 1988), such as rationalizability
or iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, are justi￿able by the two common
knowledge assumptions that
(i) the structure of the game (players, strategy space, utility-payo⁄s) is common
knowledge among the players, and
(ii) it is common knowledge among the players that no ￿unreasonable￿strategies will
be chosen.
As it turns out, however, this assertion holds only true for epistemic models where
the agents re￿ ect on the corresponding reasoning processes whereas it is not valid for
the epistemic model developed in this paper. The following example illustrates this fact.
Example. Let
p :=￿Strategy s1 is strictly dominated.￿
q :=￿Player 1 does not play strategy s1.￿
The common knowledge assumption (i) implies that, e.g., the following epistemic
statements are true
K2 (p) :=￿Player 2 knows that the strategy s1 is strictly dominated.￿
K1K2 (p) :=￿Player 1 knows that player 2 knows that strategy s1 is strictly
dominated.￿
Accordingly, the following epistemic statements hold by common knowledge assump-
tion (ii)
K2 (p ) q) :=￿Player 2 knows that player 1 does not play strategy s1 if s1 is strictly
dominated.￿
K1K2 (p ) q) :=￿Player 1 knows that player 2 knows that player 1 does not play
strategy s1 if s1 is strictly dominated.￿
The standard argument for the epistemic justi￿cation of iterated solution concepts
now claims that player 1 deduces from these assumptions that ￿Player 2 knows that
player 1 does not play strategy s1.￿More speci￿cally, it is claimed that the statement
K1K2 (q) must be true if the statements K1K2 (p) and K1K2 (p ) q) are true, or equiv-
alently, that the w⁄
K1K2 (p ) q) ) (K1K2 (p) ) K1K2 (q)) (2)
21is a theorem of the underlying epistemic logic.




0) ) (Ki (p
0) ) Ki (q
0)) (3)
for i 2 f1;2;:::g. By the substitution rule, we then obtain the following theorem
K1 (K2 (p ) q) ) (K2 (p) ) K2 (q))) ) (K1 (K2 (p ) q)) ) K1 (K2 (p) ) K2 (q)))
(4)
whereby K2 (p ) q) replaces p0 and K2 (p) ) K2 (q) replaces q0 in (3). Furthermore, it
can be shown that the following w⁄ is a theorem of TKU3
((K1 (K2 (p ) q)) ) K1 (K2 (p) ) K2 (q)))) ) (K1K2 (p ) q) ) (K1K2 (p) ) K1K2 (q))).
(5)
Assume for the moment that necessitation was a valid inference rule so that
K1 (K2 (p ) q) ) (K2 (p) ) K2 (q)))
becomes a theorem, i.e., player 1 knows that player 2￿ s reasoning process obeys the axiom
(3). In that case, we can apply modus ponens to (4) in order to obtain the theorem
(K1 (K2 (p ) q)) ) K1 (K2 (p) ) K2 (q))),
which is the antecedent in (5) so that we can - again by modus ponens - derive (2).
That is, if necessitation was added as a valid inference rule to TKU, then the player 1
could indeed deduce that player 2 knows he will not play strategy s1. However, it can be
shown that (2) is not a tautology of ESM and therefore it is not a theorem of TKU. As
a consequence, the above common knowledge assumptions (i) and (ii) are not su¢ cient
to justify iterative solution concepts when the underlying epistemic logic is TKU rather
than existing epistemic logics.
8 Concluding remarks and outlook
If an epistemic logic has a semantic interpretation by some possible world semantic of the
Kripke type, each theorem of the logic must be true in all possible worlds. According
to the interpretation of the knowledge operator by the possible world semantics, all
theorems must hence be known to the agent. As a consequence, any epistemic logic
which has a semantic interpretation by some standard model must include necessitation
as a valid inference rule. In this paper I have introduced the epistemic logic TKU for
3A formal proof can be otained upon request from the author.
22which necessitation is not a valid inference rule. While TKU therefore does not allow
for a semantic interpretation by possible world semantics, I demonstrate that TKU has
a semantic interpretation by the semantic model ESM which is e⁄ectively given as a
iterative procedure for developing truth-tables that take account of epistemic operators.
That is, every theorem of TKU is a tautology of ESM. Furthermore, I have shown that
every tautology of ESM is also a theorem of TKU. This determination theorem, which
links my semantic with my syntactic approach and vice versa, is this paper￿ s main result.
My approach is clearly an extreme concept since it describes the benchmark case of a
boundedly rational agent who is opposite to the agent with absolute power of re￿ ection.
My present approach therefore leaves severalrelevant issues unresolved which I would
like to address in subsequent research. In what follows I sketch two such issues.4
In the present paper I have adopted the standard approach of modelling the relation-
ship between the knowledge operator K and the unawareness operator U. One might
alternatively ask, why - instead of abandoning necessitation at all - I have not chosen
to weaken necessitation in the sense that the agent knows all theorems he is aware of.
There are two ways for accomplishing this. Suppose at ￿rst I added
:U (p) ) K (p) (6)
as a new axiom U4 to TKU. For this new epistemic logic TKU+U4 the agent would
know every statement he is aware of, implying - by the substitution rule - that he knows
every theorem he is aware of. The corresponding semantic interpretation by truth-tables
would then require the deletion of any rows where U (A) and K (A) are simultaneously
false to the e⁄ect that ￿awareness￿:U (A) and ￿knowlegde￿K (A) statements become
logically equivalent in this new model5. This approach would therefore be at odds with
the existing epistemic literature (cf. Section 2.3 of this paper) on unawareness, which
argues that unawareness should be distinguished from the absence of knowledge.
Alternatively, I could add the following inference rule to TKU
A
:U (A) ) K (A)
(7)
thereby ensuring that the logical equivalence between knowledge and awareness applies
only to theorems but not to arbitrary statements. That is, :U (A) ) K (A) is a theorem
of this logic if and only if A is a theorem. In that case, however, the question arises
why the agent should apply di⁄erent rules of reasoning to statements which turn out
4I am grateful to two anonymous referees for pointing me to these issues.
5Observe that the converse to U4, K (p) ) :U (p), stating that the agent is aware of statement p if
he knows p, is already a theorem of TKU.
23to be theorems than to statements which are no theorems. Nevertheless, I consider
it as necessary to have - in future research - a closer look at the relationship between
unawareness- and knowledge statements in the case that necessitation is abandoned as
a valid inference rule.
While I think that TKU has a more realistic appeal than the existing epistemic
logics, which assume necessitation as a valid inference rule, the realistic appeal of TKU
is nevertheless limited. One might, for instance, convincingly argue that any real-life
agent knows at least the theorem (p ) p) so that the epistemic statement K (p ) p)
should also be a theorem of a realistic epistemic logic. Similarly, one might argue that
there exist w⁄whose logical equivalence is so obvious that a real-life agent should know
this equivalence. Assume, e.g., that the logical equivalence between the statements p and
::p is obvious to most real-life agents. Then a realistic epistemic logic should include
the following w⁄ as theorems
K (p) ) K (::p),
K (::p) ) K (p).
It is straightforward to show that these w⁄ are not theorems of TKU but could be
derived as theorems if necessitation was added as a valid inference rule to TKU. Thus,
dropping necessitation as an inference rule has the consequence that many - seemingly -
appealing theorems of existing epistemic logics are no longer available in TKU. To quote
an anonymous referee:
￿It is true and natural that if one drops necessitation, an agent might not un-
derstand the equivalence of two logically equivalent formulas. However, there
are some natural equivalences, where one feels that even a very boundedly
rational agent should understand the equivalence of those formulas [:::]￿
While I agree in principle with this point of view, there is the practical problem of
judging which logical equivalence relations are obvious - and therefore known to real-
life agents - and which are not. If we had a list of such candidates of obvious logical
equivalences, we could easily construct a more ￿realistic￿ epistemic logic from TKU
by simply adding the corresponding epistemic statements as new axioms to the axiom
system of TKU. To generate such a list is ultimativly an empirical question, which,
while being beyond the scope of this paper, has to be addressed if we are interested in
an epistemic logic which is a realistic model of human reasoning processes.
249 Appendix
9.1 Proving soundness
Soundness is proved by combining lemma 1 and 2.
Lemma 1. Every axiom of TKU is a tautology of ESM.
Proof: Note that the axioms A1-A3 of P2 are tautologies of the propositional logic
(see Church, 1996) and therefore of ESM. In Section 5 I have already demonstrated that
the axioms U1 and U2 are tautologies of ESM. I leave it to the reader to verify that
axiom U3 is, by step 6, also a tautology of ESM. It remains to be demonstrated that
the axioms T and K are tautologies of ESM:
￿ K (p) ) p is a tautology of ESM.
1. According to step 1, assign all truth value combinations to the atomic sentence p:
K (p) ) p
v v
f f
2. According to step 3, duplicate the rows for which p is assigned v and assign v,
respectively f, in the duplicated rows to K (p):




3. By step 9 repeat the procedure to assign truth values to the main operator
according to the rules in step 2:
K (p) ) p
v v v v
f v v v
f f v f
25In all rows the main-operator is assigned true, which proves the claim.￿
￿ K (p ) q) ) (K (p) ) K (q)) is a tautology of ESM.
1. According to step 1, assign all truth value combinations to the atomic sentences
p, q:
K (p ) q) ) (K (p) ) K (q))
v v v v
v f v f
f v f v
f f f f
2. According to step 2, assign truth values to the w⁄ p ) q:
K (p ) q) ) (K (p) ) K (q))
v v v v v
v f f v f
f v v f v
f v f f f
3. According to step 3, duplicate the rows in which p is assigned v and assign v,
respectively f, in these duplicated rows to K (p). Furthermore, assign f to K (p) in the
rows where p is assigned f.
K (p ) q) ) (K (p) ) K (q))
v v v v v v
v v v f v v
v f f v v f
v f f f v f
f v v f f v
f v f f f f
4. According to step 3, duplicate the rows in which q is assigned v and assign v,
respectively f, in the duplicated rows to K (q). Furthermore, assign f to K (q) in the
rows where q is assigned f.
26K (p ) q) ) (K (p) ) K (q))
v v v v v v v
v v v v v f v
v v v f v v v
v v v f v f v
v f f v v f f
v f f f v f f
f v v f f v v
f v v f f f v
f v f f f f f
5. According to step 3, duplicate the rows for which (p ) q) is assigned v and assign
v, respectively f, in the duplicated rows to K (p ) q). Moreover, assign f to K (p ) q)
in rows where (p ) q) is assigned f.
K (p ) q) ) (K (p) ) K (q))
v v v v v v v v
f v v v v v v v
v v v v v v f v
f v v v v v f v
v v v v f v v v
f v v v f v v v
v v v v f v f v
f v v v f v f v
f v f f v v f f
f v f f f v f f
v f v v f f v v
f f v v f f v v
v f v v f f f v
f f v v f f f v
v f v f f f f f
f f v f f f f f
6. According to step 4, delete all rows for which K (p ) q) and K (p) are assigned v
while K (q) is assigned f:
27K (p ) q) ) (K (p) ) K (q))
v v v v v v v v
f v v v v v v v
f v v v v v f v
v v v v f v v v
f v v v f v v v
v v v v f v f v
f v v v f v f v
f v f f v v f f
f v f f f v f f
v f v v f f v v
f f v v f f v v
v f v v f f f v
f f v v f f f v
v f v f f f f f
f f v f f f f f
7.and 8. Assign truth values according to step 2:
K (p ) q) ) (K (p) ) K (q))
v v v v v v v v v v
f v v v v v v v v v
f v v v v v v f f v
v v v v v f v v v v
f v v v v f v v v v
v v v v v f v v f v
f v v v v f v v f v
f v f f v v v f f f
f v f f v f v v f f
v f v v v f f v v v
f f v v v f f v v v
v f v v v f f v f v
f f v v v f f v f v
v f v f v f f v f f
f f v f v f f v f f
In all rows the main-operator is assigned true, which proves the claim.￿
28Lemma 2. If w⁄ A is proved in TKU by applying the inference rules modus po-
nens, simultaneous substitution, UR1, or UR2 to tautologies of TKU, then A is
a tautology of ESM.
Proof:
(i) Modus ponens. Suppose to the contrary that there is some row in the truth table
of B such that B is false while A and (A ) B) are true at all rows of their truth tables.
Notice that this can only happen if (i) a row where B is false was deleted in (A ) B)
according to some step 4, 6 or 7 or (ii) there exists some row in (A ) B) where A is
false such that this row has been deleted in A according to some step 4, 6 or 7. Observe
that case (ii) is impossible: if some row was deleted in A it cannot reappear in (A ) B).






which is deleted in (A ) B) according to some step 4, 6 or 7 but not in B, i.e., B
remains false at this row. The proof proceeds by demonstrating that the existence of
such a row implies the existence of another row which takes on identical truth values in







such that only one row is deleted. The other row then contradicts the assumption
that (A ) B) was a tautology. I prove this claim for the deletion of rows according to
step 6 by presuming that the w⁄ U (C) and K (C) appear together in (A ) B) but not
in A or in B, (the proofs for step 4 and 7 are similar and left to the reader).
Consider at ￿rst the case where U (C) occurs in A while K (C) occurs in B such that
there is a row
... U (C) ... ) ... K (C) ...
... ...
v v f v v
... ...
29which has to be deleted by step 6. But then, duplication by step 5, also implies the
existence of a row
... U (C) ... ) ... K (C) ...
... ...
f v v v
... ...
which only di⁄ers in the truth value at U (C). As a consequence, the truth value of
B remains false whereas A is, by assumption, true. Thus, we have for this row
... U (C) ... ) ... K (C) ...
... ...
f v f v v
... ...
, i.e., (A ) B) becomes false. Finally, observe that this row is not deleted since
U (C) is false.
Consider now the case where K (C) occurs in A while U (C) occurs in B such that
there is a row
... K (C) ... ) ... U (C) ...
... ...
v v f v v
... ...
which has to be deleted by step 6. By duplication according to step 3, there must
exist a row
... K (C) ... ) ... U (C) ...
... ...
f v f v v
... ...
such that the truth value of B remains false whereas A is, by assumption, true.
Since K (C) is here false this row is not deleted implying that (A ) B) cannot be a
tautology.￿
(ii) Simultaneous substitution. If every occurrence of an atomic sentence p is replaced
in A by some w⁄ B, i.e., Afp=Bg, then the truth table of Afp=Bg has - after duplication
and deletion according to steps 3-7 - at least as many rows as the truth table of A
(compare the reasoning under (i) modus ponens). For the additional rows the truth
30value of B is - analogously to p - either true or false so that Afp=Bg remains a tautology
if A is a tautology.￿
(iii) UR1. Suppose to the contrary that the application of UR1 results in a w⁄
U (A) ) :K (:K (::::K (A)))
that is not a tautology. That is, U (A) is assigned true while :K (:K (::::K (A))) is
assigned false, which is only possible at rows where K (:K (::::K (A))) is also assigned
true. But according to step 7 all rows are deleted such that U (A) and K (:K (:::::K (A)))
are simultaneously true.￿
(iv) UR2. Suppose to the contrary that the application of UR2 results in a w⁄
U (A) ) :K (:K (::::K (U (A))))
that is not a tautology. That is, U (A) and K (:K (::::K (U (A)))) must be simultane-
ously true, which is impossible by step 6.￿￿
9.2 Proving completeness
At ￿rst I describe an iterative procedure by which I construct for any given E 2 ￿k,
k ￿ 0, the corresponding w⁄ (1). If E 2 ￿0 simply set F := E in order to derive (1).
Consider now some w⁄ E 2 ￿k such that k ￿ 1.
At the ￿rst stage of the iterative procedure replace in E all occurrences of the sepa-
rated epistemic w⁄
K (B1);K (B2);:::;U (Bn);U (Bn+1);:::
by the following variables for atomic sentences:
pK(B1);pK(B2);:::;pU(Bn);pU(Bn+1);:::
and denote the resulting w⁄ as E￿ whereby E￿ 2 ￿0. Now take E￿ as consequent and
successively add in several steps antecedents A1







































312. For all pK(Bj2) such that Bj2 = U (Dj2) for some w⁄ Dj2 add the following





U (Dj2) ) :pK(Bj2)
￿
3. For all pK(Bj3) such that Bj3 = :K (::::K (U (Dj3))) for some w⁄ Dj3 add the





U (Dj3) ) :p:K(::::K(U(Dj3)))
￿
4. For all pK(B0






for some w⁄ B0
j4;B00
j4
















pU(Bj5) ) (Bj5 ) Bj5)
￿






pU(Bj6) ) :K (Bj6)
￿
7. For all pU(Bj7) and pK(B) such that B = :K (::::K (Bj7)) add the following





pU(Bj7) ) :K (::::K (Bj7))
￿
Observe that F 1 2 ￿k￿1: there do not occur any epistemic w⁄in E￿; the antecedents
A1
j1, respectively A1
j5, contain w⁄B whose epistemic degree is exactly one less than that
of the w⁄K (B), respectively U (B); moreover, the remaining antecedents have a strictly
smaller epistemic degree than E.
In case k = 1, set F := F 1 2 ￿0 and observe that we are done deriving the w⁄ (1).
If instead k > 1, then proceed to the second stage of the iterative procedure and replace
in F 1 all occurrences of the separated epistemic w⁄
K (C1);K (C2);:::;U (Cn);U (Cn+1);:::
by the variables:
pK(C1);pK(C2);:::;pU(Cn);pU(Cn+1);:::
32Denote the resulting w⁄ as F 1￿ whereby F 1￿ 2 ￿0. As in the ￿rst stage of the iterative






























whereby the antecedents A2
i are added according to the above steps 1-7. Notice that
F 2 2 ￿k￿2. Thus, if k = 2 set F := F 2 2 ￿0 in order to obtain the desired w⁄ (1). If
instead k > 2 we have to go through another stage of the iterative procedure in order
to construct a w⁄ F 3 2 ￿k￿3 in the obvious way. For E 2 ￿k we arrive after exactly k
stages at the corresponding w⁄ (1).
Lemma 3: Consider some w⁄ E 2 ￿k, k ￿ 1, and the corresponding w⁄ (1), which
had been constructed by the iterative procedure described above. If E is a tautology
of ESM then F is a tautology of the propositional calculus.
Proof: While E is, by assumption, a tautology, the same is not necessarily true for
the consequent E￿ in (1). Since all epistemic w⁄ in E are replaced in E￿ by variables
for atomic propositions, there may exist some row in the truth table of E￿ that had
been deleted in the development of the truth table of E. If E￿ is false at such a row it
would not be a tautology despite the fact that E is a tautology. The proof of lemma 3
proceeds by demonstrating that whenever the consequent E￿ may be false at some row,
some antecedent Ai, i = 1;2;:::, in (1) must also be false. As a consequence, F would
be true at such rows thereby proving that F is a tautology of the propositional calculus.
At ￿rst observe that the iterative procedure for generating (1) ensures that there
occur pK(B), pU(B0) in F for any epistemic w⁄ K (B), U (B0) occurring in E. Because
of the steps 3,4,6,7 of the iterative procedure of the development of truth-tables there
may exist truth-value combinations for E￿ that do not appear in the truth table of E.
In what follows I comprehensively investigate all possible cases.











That is, the truth tables of E￿ and E di⁄er because there are rows in E￿ where B is





resulting from step 1 of the iterative procedure for generating F, must be false. Thus,
F is true at such rows.￿
Case 2: According to step 4 we have for E rows


















Thus, the truth tables of E￿ and E di⁄er because there are rows in E￿ where
pK(B0)B00) and pK(B0) are true while pK(B00) is false. By step 4 of the iterative proce-






34which is false at such rows.￿
Case 3: By step 6, we have for E rows such that










In that case the truth tables of E￿ and E di⁄er because there are rows in E￿ where
pU(B) and pK(U(B)) are simultaneously true. For such rows the antecedent
￿
U (B) ) :pK(U(B))
￿
,
resulting from step 2 of generating F, ensures that F is true.￿
Case 4: Also by step 6, we have for E rows such that












U (B) ) :pK(:K(:::::K(U(B))))
￿
,
resulting from step 3 of generating F, guarantees that F is true.￿
We leave it to the reader to verify in a similar way that the steps 6 and 7 of the
iterative procedure of generating w⁄ F ensure that F is true whenever the rows of E
and E￿ di⁄er because of step 7 of the iterative procedure for the development of truth-
tables. This ￿nally proves the lemma 3.￿￿
Lemma 4: Consider some w⁄ F which had been constructed for some w⁄ E 2 ￿k,
k ￿ 1, by the iterative procedure described above. Denote by F ￿ the w⁄ that results
when all occurrences of variables for atomic propositions pK(B), pU(B0) in F are








M ) E):::) (8)
If F is a theorem of the propositional calculus, then E is a theorem of TKU.
Proof: Observe at ￿rst that F ￿ is - by the substitution rule - a theorem of TKU if F
is a theorem of the propositional calculus. Thus, if we can establish that all antecedents
A￿
i, i = 1;2;:::, in (8) are theorems of TKU, the E is, by repeated application of modus
ponens, a theorem of TKU. According to the seven steps of the iterative procedure
of generating the w⁄ (1) there are seven di⁄erent cases of how the antecedents A￿
i,
i = 1;2;:::, may look like. In the remainder of the proof I demonstrate for each case
that the corresponding antecedent is a theorem of TKU.





so that the corresponding antecedent becomes
A
￿
j1 := (K (Bj1) ) Bj1).
Applying the substitution rule to the knowledge axiom K shows that A￿
j1 is a theorem.￿
36Case 2. By step 2,
Aj2 :=
￿





j2 := (U (Dj2) ) :K (U (Dj2))),
which is a theorem of TKU by axiom U3 and the substitution rule.￿
Case 3. By step 3,
Aj3 :=
￿





j3 := (U (Dj3) ) :K (::::K (U (Dj3)))).
Since U (p) ) :K (U (p)) is an axiom of TKU, a repeated application of the inference
rule UR2 and an application of the substitution rule establishes A￿
j3 as a theorem of
TKU.￿







































which is a theorem by axiom T and the substitution rule.￿
Case 5. By step 5,
Aj5 :=
￿





j5 := (U (Bj5) ) (Bj5 ) Bj5)).
Notice that q ) (p ) p) is a theorem of the propositional calculus so that, by the
substitution rule, A￿
j5 is also a theorem.￿
Case 6. By step 6,
Aj6 :=
￿





j6 := (U (Bj6) ) :K (Bj6)),
which is a theorem by axiom U2 and the substitution rule.￿
37Case 7. By step 7,
Aj7 :=
￿





j7 := (U (Bj7) ) :K (::::K (Bj7))).
Since U (p) ) :K (p) is an axiom of TKU, a repeated application of the inference rule
UR1 and an application of the substitution rule gives A￿
j7 as a theorem of TKU.￿￿
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